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Abstract Smart Grid, also known as the next generation of the power grid, is considered
as a power infrastructure with advanced information and communication technologies
(ICT) that will enhance the efficiency and reliability of power systems. For the essential
benefits that come with Smart Grid, there are also security risks due to the complexity of
advanced ICT utilized in the architecture of Smart Grid to interconnect a huge number of
devices and subsystems. Cybersecurity is one of the emerging major threats in Smart Grid
that needs to be considered as the attack surface increased. To prevent cyber-attacks, new
techniques and methods need to be evaluated in a real-world environment or in a testbed.
However, the costs for setting-up Smart Grid testbed is extensive. In this article, we
focused on the development of a Smart Grid testbed with a low-cost hardware and software
for cybersecurity research and education. As a case study, we evaluated the testbed with
most common cyber-attack such as denial of service attack. In addition, the testbed is a
useful resource for cybersecurity research and education on different aspects of SCADA
systems such as protocol implementation, and PLC programming.
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1 Introduction
Electricity is very important in our daily life as it is used for the operation of many
electronics devices from our homes to offices to hospitals and manufacturing industries.
Due to its importance, it is crucial to maintain its availability as high as possible and to be
used in the most efficient manner as its resources are limited.
Some developing countries face the problem of not having the ability to generate and
provide electric power on a continuous basis to their cities to produce goods and services
and for daily activities due to poor use and management of resources. This problem has
prompted for the research of a system with advanced computing technologies for the safe,
efficient and reliable way of delivering electric power—the Smart Grid.
Smart Grid is an essential part of sustainable smart cities. Smart Grid is the next
generation of power grid in which the management and distribution of electricity are
performed in advanced two-way communication systems. The Smart Grid system is made
up of subsystems that are interconnected to provide the flow of information and electricity
in a two-way communications using information and communication technologies (ICT)
for safer, cleaner and more reliable electricity [1]. The extensive use of cyber infrastructure
presents serious consequences with respect to security of physical systems [2–4].
In the Smart Grid there are four subsystems: generation, transmission, distribution and
advanced metering subsystems. These systems must work together in the best possible
manner (smart) and be resilient to physical and cyber-attacks. Typically, a Smart Grid is a
combination of [1]:
1. Smart infrastructure system: a modernized system of the conventional power grid.
2. Smart management system: management mechanisms deployed within the infrastruc-
ture for safe, clean and reliable electricity.
3. Smart protection system: security implementations to protect the system from physical
and cyber-attacks to ensure that the security objectives of the system (Confidentiality,
Integrity and Availability) are achieved.
Cybersecurity is one of the emerging major threats in Smart Grid that needs to be
considered as the attack surface increased [3]. To prevent cyber-attacks, new techniques
need to be evaluated in a real-world environment or in a testbed. However, the costs for
setting-up Smart Grid laboratory and testbed is extensive. In fact, the average expenditure
to build a Smart Grid laboratories are in the order of 2 million euro [5]. Such cost is a
significant obstacle to build new laboratories for research and education purposes. In this
article, we focused on the development of a Smart Grid testbed with a low-cost hardware
and software for cybersecurity research and education. The design objective is such that it
able to simulate accurately real-world cyber-attacks scenario using low-cost hardware and
software that can be used in the classroom. In fact, our Arduino based testbed can be
developed with the cost of less than 150 lb sterling (excluding the computers).
The main contributions of the article are:
• The development of real-world Smart Grid testbed using low-cost hardware and
software.
• The development of SCADA intrusion detection system (IDS) and real-world cyber-
attacks scenarios.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
information on the Smart Grid with focus on its characteristics. Section 3 discusses the
method implemented in developing Smart Grid testbed using low-cost hardware and
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software. In Sect. 4, the simulation results from our case study experiments using dis-
tributed denial of service (DDoS) attack are discussed. Finally, a conclusion is highlighted
in Sect. 5.
2 Background
2.1 Smart Grid
Over the last century, the traditional power grid has functioned with the involvement of
centralized power plants that fed power over a one-way channel from the distributor to the
consumer. There has been a burden on the traditional power grid with several technical and
economic issues [6]. This problem has led to the development of the next generation of
power system known as Smart Grid which integrates advanced ICT for more efficient and
reliable power systems (Fig. 1).
Smart Grid is a modern power system infrastructure that has many advantages. Some of
the characteristics of the Smart Grid are:
Self-Healing Smart Grid may redirect the flow of electricity from distribution points to
homes and industries when there is an interruption in an electrical transmission path due to
severe weather conditions, technical problems, etc. This is one of the functionalities and
advantageous factors that can automatically adjust the flow of electricity to prevent power
loss that could affect the production of goods and services.
Resilience to Attacks Due to its complexity that interconnects generation, transmission,
distribution and advanced metering subsystems, it has a wider area of security vulnera-
bilities that needs to be addressed. The Smart Grid is designed to be resilient to physical
Fig. 1 Smart Grid
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attacks, cyber-attacks, and natural disasters as it is one of national critical infrastructure
that crucial for the economic welfare and security.
Increase in Power Quality Availability of electricity is not the only important thing to be
considered but the quality in terms of maintaining a constant voltage is also equally
important. Manufacturing industries rely on power quality for production therefore voltage
variations could cause productivity losses which will in turn to cost increase. The Smart
Grid increases the quality of power through effective transmission from power plants and
distribution from step down transformers.
The security requirements in Smart Grid are: attack detection and resilience operations,
secure and efficient communication protocols, identification, authentication and access
control. The security of the Smart Grid is an important issue because a disruption will have
significant societal and economic impacts [2–4].
The Smart Grid uses control system applications such as supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) integrated with various industrial communication protocols such as
DNP3, Modbus, PROFIBUS, Zigbee, Profinet, EtherNet/IP, etc. to control and monitor
various physical aspects of the Smart Grid’s subsystems. A SCADA typically communi-
cates with external devices via the SCADA communicator (protocol handlers such as
Modbus, DNP3, etc.).
Generally, Smart Grid network architecture comprises of:
1. Generation System Architecture Corresponds to specific controller logic used to
automate the generation process of power.
2. Transmission System Architecture Transmission mechanisms to the distribution points
and to end-users.
3. Distribution System Architecture Distribution systems comprise of substations for
energy conditioning, monitoring and automation. These substations communicate back
to central SCADA systems in data centers for real-time monitoring, load balancing and
energy management and to respond to power outages.
4. Advanced Metering Architecture This architecture consists of systems that are used not
only to measure energy utilization but also to remotely connect or disconnect meters.
The use of smart meters adds the capability of sending commands from a centralized
system and receiving responses. It consists of three primary components: smart meters,
a communication network, and an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) server or
head-end [7].
Some of the motives of cyber-attacks on the Smart Grid are: theft of information, denial
of service (DoS) and manipulation of service (MoS). The attack tools are used to conduct
various attack methods such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, replay attack, human–
machine interface (HMI) attack, NAN attack, jamming attack, DOS attack, bad data
injection, etc. [8, 9].
2.2 Intrusion Detection System
Intrusion detection is a process of using a set of methods (detection system) to detect
anomalous activity at the host and network level. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are
software or hardware systems that automate the process of monitoring the events occurring
in a computer system or network, analyzing them for signs of security problems [10]. IDS
can be classified into two categories: network-based and host-based [11].
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Host-based IDS (HIDS) is installed as a monitoring agent to protect a single host or
endpoint and monitors activities on the host system. HIDS monitors the system and
application files to detect any malicious activity and alert when something anomalous has
happened. HIDS are reactive and proactive; it can sniff packets coming to a host and alert
when a signature pattern is found [10].
Network-based IDS (NIDS) on the other hand, protects the whole network from attacks
by monitoring traffic on the network. It captures every packet travelling across the network
and analyses against a database of signatures. One of the most popular NIDS applications
is Snort [12]. To prevent malicious activities in the network, NIDS typically uses two
different detection methods: signature-based and anomaly-based detection.
Signature-based detection works more like anti-virus software and has a database of
known attack signatures which need to be updated regularly. Snort is the de facto standard
of signature-based NIDS. Snort has a decoder for normalizing packets, a detection engine
for comparing packets with signatures, a logger for recording packet details and an alert
system for triggering alarms. When a packet is matched with an intruder signature an alert
is generated and the packet is logged to a database [12].
With anomaly-based detection, the NIDS starts with a known good state and use that to
establish a baseline of normal activity. It compares the current state with the baseline and
alerts when an anomaly is detected [11].
IDS supports active and passive response or a mixture of the two responses. With active
response, automated actions take place when certain types of intrusions are detected. These
actions are put in place to collect additional information on a suspected attack to try to
resolve the detection of an attack and gather information to support the investigation.
Another automated action is to halt an attack in progress and block access by reconfiguring
routers and firewalls to block network ports, services and protocol that are being used by an
attacker or terminating an attacker’s connection by injecting TCP reset packets [10].
Passive responses include alarms and notifications and SNMP traps [10]. They only
provide information to users so that certain actions or decisions can be made based on the
information provide. Most of the IDSs rely on this type of response.
The response of IDS has four possibilities [10]:
1. True positive: real attack—IDS alert
2. True negative: no attack—no IDS alert
3. False positive: no attack—IDS alert
4. False negative: real attack—no IDS alert
2.3 Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack
Denial-of-service is one of the most common cyber-attacks in the last decade. The
objective of this attack is to disrupt a system from its normal operation by sending mes-
sages to the victim machine to crash, reboot or operate in an improper manner. Attackers
exploit the vulnerabilities on the target systems or applications running in the systems and
use that means to attack the systems. Attackers’ main goal is to compromise the avail-
ability of services [2].
Typically, a DoS attack is achieved by sending a vast number of packets to consume key
resources such as bandwidth, CPU, memory, etc. on target systems or network thereby
making the victim spend its resources in handling or responding to the attack traffic. DoS
attacks are mostly launched from single point powerful machines with fast processors and
a lot of network bandwidth.
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A DDoS attack is a derivative of DoS attack that uses many hosts to attack. These hosts
are known as ‘bots’ or ‘zombies’. A collection of bots (botnet) operates under the control
of a ‘master’ to launch DDoS attacks by sending some traffic from different sources to a
target to overwhelm or exhaust the target’s resources [2, 13].
In reality, DDoS attack is easily performed by open-source DDoS attack tools such as
Bonesi, Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) [14] or High Orbit Ion Cannon (HOIC) [15].
3 Methodologies
In this article, the approach is to develop a testbed of the Smart Grid infrastructure using
combination of various low-cost hardware and software such as the Arduino microcon-
troller [16] (PLC), XBee radio modules (wireless data acquisition modules), Winlog Lite
[17] (SCADA), Bonesi [18] (botnet simulator), Snort [12] (IDS), Suricata [19] (IPS) and
exploit the system with a cyber-attack application.
3.1 System Configuration
The overview of the system is illustrated in Fig. 2. Zigbee [20] is adopted as the main
communication protocol between subsystems. An Arduino microcontroller is connected to
a personal computer using a serial cable. One of the XBee module is connected to the
Arduino as an interface for data transmission to the SCADA server and for sending
commands from the server via the serial communication port of the computer. The SCADA
server uses Modbus TCP/IP [21] as a communication protocol to send commands and
receive data from the field devices. Modbus is an application layer protocol used for
communication in a master/slave architecture in industrial automation. It was developed in
1978 by Modicon (now Schneider Electric) for use with PLCs [22]. The protocol is similar
Fig. 2 System architecture
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to HTTP protocol which consists of a request by a client and a response issued by a server.
In the client–server paradigm of the Modbus protocol, the master is a client and the slave is
a server because the master sends requests to the slave holding data in the Modbus memory
block. The protocol was first implemented for asynchronous serial network communication
(RS232/RS485) and has now been developed to use the TCP/IP stack for communication
on port 502 (Modbus TCP/IP) [21].
XBee communication is used within the system. The Arduino will be connected to a
personal computer using a serial cable. One of the XBee modules will be connected to the
Arduino as an interface for data transmission to the SCADA server and for sending
commands from the server via the serial communication port of the computer. The SCADA
server will use Modbus on port 502 as a communication protocol to send commands and
receive data from the field devices.
There are two communication paths in the system: one from the microcontroller to the
computer (using SCADA protocol) and the other from the microcontroller to the XBee
modules (using XBee protocol) and potentiometers. The XBee modules are configured as
DigiMesh nodes to simplify the implementation of the Smart Grid. The SCADA is sim-
ulated by Winlog Lite. The Winlog Lite is used in conjunction with the Modbus TCP
protocol to communicate with the devices, create process variables (tags) to store the data
within the SCADA server and design the graphical user interface (dashboard) of the Smart
Grid system. An Arduino microcontroller is programmed to read analog and digital values
from the XBee modules and pass them to the SCADA server, pass on commands from the
SCADA server to the XBee modules and external devices and to make intelligent decisions
as expected of a Smart Grid system. To evaluate the proposed system, a DoS cyber-attack
is implemented to study the behavior of the system and a preventive measure was also put
in place.
3.2 System Architecture
As illustrated in Fig. 2, there is a remote Local Area Network (LAN) which consists of
smart meters and a gateway or a communication mechanism for the transmission of data to
the grid central point via a PLC (Arduino). There is also a power supply network which
consists of the grid, a generator and a wind turbine. These power generation units send data
to the grid central point via a PLC (Arduino).
The Grid network consists of the SCADA server as an HMI, IDS, a network switch and
a PLC (Arduino). A cyber-attack (Bonesi) machine is also connected to a network switch
to implement the cyber-attack (DoS) on the Smart Grid system.
The circuit diagram in Fig. 3 shows two XBee router radios acting as smart meters in
remote locations. These radios are connected to a central XBee (coordinator) in a personal
area network. There are two potentiometers connected to the remote radios to simulate
power consumption from different homes. The XBees send the data wirelessly to the
coordinator XBee for transmission to the SCADA server via the serial communication port
on the Arduino.
There are other potentiometers connected directly to the Arduino as the Grid utility,
generator and wind turbine (power generation units). The LEDs are indicators used to
monitor various parts of the system and the dip switches are simply used to control the flow
of power.
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3.3 SCADA System
The SCADA application is configured by creating a Modbus device driver which is used to
communicate with the Arduino (PLC). The Modbus configuration such as device ID,
Modbus addresses in the SCADA application should be the same as PLC configuration.
This ensures that data is transferred effectively from the PLC to the SCADA application.
The Modbus protocol is much like the HTTP protocol which consists of an initiation of a
request by a client and a response issued by a server. In the client–server paradigm of the
Modbus protocol, the master is a client and the slave is a server because the master sends
requests to the slave holding data in the Modbus memory block.
The SCADA application also contains database tags for storing data from PLC and
displaying the data in different forms on a human–machine interface (HMI) (see Figs. 4,
5). The HMI is built with designing tools within the SCADA application for monitoring
and controlling purposes.
3.4 PLC Configuration
The Arduino microcontroller is programmed to be used as a PLC by compiling the Modbus
TCP functions in a library to be loaded on to the board. The PLC is used as a slave to
respond to requests from the SCADA server. The serial peripheral interface library,
Modbus library and Ethernet library are uploaded onto the microcontroller board to
facilitate the implementation of the Modbus protocol and transfer of Modbus data.
An IP address is configured for the Ethernet shield on the Arduino board to enable data
exchange with the SCADA server via Ethernet port. The IP address of the PLC is the slave
address and the IP address of the SCADA server is the master address of the PLC. The
addresses of the PLC and SCADA server are typically in the same subnet or in different
Fig. 3 Circuit diagram
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subnets with routers between subnets. The simulation tools used for the Smart Grid
infrastructure are connected to analog and digital inputs/outputs of the Arduino. The
program code is written such that the Arduino reads data from the analog pins and writes
the data to the holding registers of the Modbus addresses for transfer to the SCADA server
on request.
To implement the basic functionality of Smart Grid, the program code reads the data
coming from the XBees (home simulators) via the XBee coordinator which is connected to
the serial TX and RX on the Arduino (see Fig. 6). A value of zero signifies a power cut,
resulting in system notification and automatic restore of outage.
Fig. 4 SCADA server Gate Builder window
Fig. 5 SCADA server graphical interface (HMI)
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3.5 XBee Radio Modules
There are three XBee radio modules used for the simulation of the Smart Grid system (see
Fig. 7). The XBees were used as simulation hardware for smart meters and a gateway in
remote areas. The configuration of the radios was done with the XCTU software. Two of
the radio modules were configured as XBee router radio modules and the other one as an
XBee coordinator (gateway). The XBees were configured to have the same PAN IDs for
exchange and routing of data to the Arduino (PLC).
Fig. 6 Arduino board as a PLC
Fig. 7 XBee radio modules
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The router radio modules were configured to send data to the coordinator radio by
specifying a destination high address of 0013A200 and a destination low address as the
address of the coordinator radio. For router radio modules to be able to read analog data
from the potentiometers and send the data to the coordinator, the data input 0 (DIO 0) of
the router radios were set as analog inputs using the XCTU software.
The XBee radio modules were configured as DigiMesh nodes to simplify the imple-
mentation of the Smart Grid. Digi XBee DigiMesh 2.4 [23] delivers end-point device
connectivity with a globally deployable 2.4 GHz transceiver. The DigiMesh protocol is a
peer-to-peer protocol that offers network stability through an effective network operation,
self-healing and a low power consumption.
The coordinator radio module was connected to the Arduino via the serial communi-
cation port (TX and RX). The radio modules form a wireless PAN whereas the coordinator
radio module and the Arduino form a wired area network.
3.6 Snort and Suricata (IDS and IPS)
Intrusion detection is a process of using a set of methods (detection system) to detect
anomalous activity at the host and network level. IDS is software or hardware systems that
automate the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network,
analyzing them for signs of security problems [10].
Snort is installed and configured to run as a NIDS by editing the configuration files
(snort.conf and local.rules) and downloading community rules that Snort use to detect
intrusion. The local rules configuration file can be customized for specific purposes. A
typical Snort rule contains the rule header and the rule options. The rule header includes
the rule’s action (e.g., drop), protocol (e.g., tcp), source IP, source port, direction, desti-
nation IP, and destination port. The rule options consist of the alert message and
information.
Snort can be run without root privileges by creating a user and group under which the
daemon can run. The installation and configuration of Suricata is the same as Snort except
that Suricata is configured to be used in a detection and prevention mode by dropping
malicious packets.
For example, if an attacker attempts to send 100,000 tcp packets in 1 s to the Modbus
default port (502), the Snort rule (sid: 10002) will be triggered, as shown in Fig. 8.
Fig. 8 Suricata (NIPS) local rules configuration file
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3.7 BoNeSi (DDoS Simulator)
In this work, Bonesi is used to implement the DDoS attack. Bonesi is a very popular botnet
simulator that can generate ICMP, UDP and TCP packets to flood a network in a test
environment [18]. Bonesi is very powerful tools that can generate up to 150,000 packets
per second (pps) and even more depending on the system hardware specification [18].
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Flow of System Data
The first test was to examine data exchange between the grid and the subsystems. As
shown in Fig. 9, 10 and 11, there was communication and flow of data from the Grid
subsystems to the Smart Grid central server. This implied that the Modbus TCP protocol
has been implemented successfully and functions as expected. A change in the data in the
subsystems is transmitted to the Smart Grid central point and displayed in numerical
mimics, measurement displays and graphical form. This set up the platform for carrying
out the attack and implementing a defense mechanism.
Figure 9 shows the numeric values of the power generation and consumption of the
various power units in kilowatts per hour (kWh) in white text boxes. The kWh value for the
homes is an estimation of the average power consumption in the UK [24]. The annual
estimation is used to provide a bigger data for the project. There are also gauges repre-
senting the various power units and the mains frequency. The mains frequency in the UK is
49.7 Hz and this was implemented to provide information when more power was needed to
prevent an outage. There were red LEDs to indicate the flow of power to the homes.
Figure 10 shows the graphical view of the data coming from the homes, grid utility,
generator and wind turbine. The trend was plotted as time against kilowatts per hour.
Fig. 9 SCADA server displaying receipt of data
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Because this trend is real-time, it provides depth information to the control operator to
monitor the system and analyze the data in real time.
When the SCADA server was up and running there were requests or queries for Modbus
data sent from the server to the PLC holding the data from field devices. As shown in
Fig. 11, the Modbus TCP query packets from the server (192.168.1.1) and response
packets from the PLC (192.168.1.2) were captured in Wireshark. This proves the
Fig. 10 SCADA server displaying data in a chart
Fig. 11 Wireshark showing exchange of Modbus TCP request and response packets
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successful implementation of the Modbus protocol as a communication mechanism in this
study. The Modbus protocol running in default port 502.
4.2 Attack Implementation
DoS attack was chosen to reveal the vulnerabilities of the system and the extent of the
failure of the system. As shown in Fig. 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16, the system could not function
as expected due to the DoS attack. Attacking the SCADA server crashed the server (PC)
leading to a Windows ‘‘Blue-Screen-of-Death.’’ The second attack on a subsystem of the
Smart Grid (PLC) caused an inconsistent response to requests from the SCADA server
leading to device driver read errors, no data from subsystems and an unexpected fluctuation
in data or intermittent communication between the Smart Grid server and the subsystems.
It can be observed in Fig. 12 that botnet attacks were created from different ports
(sources) which produced 11,944 requests in less than 5 s. The large number of requests
overwhelmed the PLC in just 5 s causing the PLC to stop responding to legitimate requests
from the SCADA server. The PLC has allocated all of its resources to respond to the botnet
attack requests.
Due to the attack, Fig. 13 shows the unanswered requests leading to fifty-nine read
errors and a ‘‘KO’’ status of the Modbus device driver which stopped the driver from
working (red highlighted text) although it was enabled.
The read errors had an effect of presenting no data to the SCADA database tags as
shown in Fig. 14.
The unanswered requests resulting from the read errors caused a drop of communication
between the server and the PLC for some time. Figure 15 shows the effects of the inter-
mittent communication on the data from the various subsystems.
Figure 16 shows the exchange of packets (SYN and ACK) between an attack source
(255.255.255.255) and the PLC (192.168.1.2). Every single packet of the thousands of
packets on the wire was captured. Because the attack source did not acknowledge receipt
Fig. 12 Bonesi DDoS simulator flooding the network with SYN packets
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Fig. 13 SCADA server device driver read errors. (Color figure online)
Fig. 14 Lost communication between Smart Grid server and subsystems
Fig. 15 Intermittent communication between systems
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of the data from the PLC it created a half-opened connection indicating to the PLC that the
TCP connection should be kept alive for data retransmission. The open connection con-
sumed the resources of the PLC causing it to reject the processing of requests from the
SCADA server. It can be seen from the capture file (see Fig. 16) that there were no
acknowledgements (ACK) packets from the attack device.
Fig. 16 Wireshark showing captured DoS SYN packets
Fig. 17 Snort packet capture information
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4.3 Cybersecurity Mitigation
After designing and building the Smart Grid testbed it was tested by attacking the various
components of the testbed. An intrusion detection and prevention systems were deployed
and it can be seen in Figs. 17, 18 and 19 that the system had been able to resist the cyber-
attack by dropping the packets that were meant to flood the network. There was a steadily
drop of packets at the initial stage because the NIPS could not drop all the attack packets in
the fastest possible time or at the rate at which the requests were directed to the SCADA
server and the PLC.
Figure 17 provides more information on the packet processing rate in seconds, run time
of the NIDS, total packets received, analyzed and dropped, etc.
Figures 18 and 19 show the packets that were detected and dropped as a result of
matching the DoS signature in the detection database of Snort and Suricata. The cyber-
security mitigation system sniffed the packets, pre-processed the packets by checking them
against plug-ins that determine the behavior of packets. The pre-processed packets were
passed on to the detection engine with the plug-ins for a thorough check with the defined
set of rules. The rule set can be continuously augmented with new rules as further mali-
cious activities are detected.
As typical NIDS and NIPS implementation, when a match is found, an alert is raised,
and the packet is dropped as observed in Figs. 18 and 19.
After the deployment of the cybersecurity mitigation with IDS and IPS, Figs. 20 and 21
show that the SCADA server and PLC have been able to operate continuously despite
ongoing DoS attack.
Fig. 18 Snort NIDS alerting intrusion detection
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5 Summary
Cybersecurity is one of the emerging major threats in Smart Grid that needs to be con-
sidered as the attack surface increased. To prevent cyber-attacks, new techniques need to
be evaluated in a real-world environment or in a testbed. However, the costs for setting-up
Smart Grid testbed is extensive. The article has revealed the significance of protecting
mission-critical systems from cyber-attacks. These SCADA systems are found in various
sectors of the engineering world and provide economic and societal benefits to individuals
and nations. The vulnerabilities of such systems need to be considered to provide defense
mechanisms that would protect them.
Fig. 19 Suricata NIPS dropping attack packets
Fig. 20 SCADA system running as expected despite ongoing attack
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In this study, we focused on the development of a Smart Grid testbed with a low-cost
hardware and software for cybersecurity research and education. We proposed a low-cost
Smart Grid testbed based on Arduino microcontroller. As a study case, DDoS cyber-attack
was simulated and showed an expected effect on the system. The cyber-attack imple-
mentation was successful and the NIDS and NIPS were able to detect and prevent the
attack after they were deployed. However, the IPS reacted partially to the attack at the
initial stage due to the rate at which the attack happened took full control of the network,
but the defense systems were eventually successfully blocked the attack after a few
minutes once the attack packets were identified and processed more effectively. Further-
more, the testbed can be deployed with low amount of resources, providing educational
benefits in terms of various scenarios that can be implemented and evaluated.
The work would be best continued by considering how the subsystems are implemented
to provide a fully functioning Smart Grid infrastructure, other ways of attacking and
protecting the system. This would require more advanced hardware and software for data
generation and transmission, power distribution from the main grid and substations, dif-
ferent communication protocols, and more advanced cyber defense mechanisms such as
machine learning based IDS and IPS.
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